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HIS article provides a comprehensive overview of the contested
political topic of reform of the Canadian Senate. It begins by pro-
viding brief outlines on the Senate as an institution and the history
of Senate reform, including the recent history of reform under the Harper
Government and in the aftermath of the Canadian Senate Expenses
Scandal. It goes on to examine the Supreme Court of Canada's April
2014 decision in Reference re Senate Reform, which was the Court's first
in-depth analysis of the post-1982 constitutional amendment process and
the correct way several commonly proposed reforms to the Senate could
be implemented. The article then highlights the positions of the three
major Canadian political parties on Senate reform following Reference re
Senate Reform before concluding.
I. THE CANADIAN SENATE: A STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW
The powers, composition, and other aspects of the Canadian Senate are
laid out by two of the documents that make up the Canadian Constitu-
tion, the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Constitution Act, 1982.1 It is
through those two documents that the Senate as an institution is gov-
erned and empowered.
* Christopher is a student in his final year of study at the SMU Dedman School of
Law. Prior to beginning law school he earned a Bachelor of Arts from Trinity
University and a Master of Letters from the University of St. Andrews. Christo-
pher would like to thank his family, friends, and professors for their continuing
support of him in his academic endeavors.
1. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, §§ 21-36 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, app. II, no. 5 (Can.); Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act, 1982, c. 11, §§ 38-47 (U.K.). Note that originally the Constitution Act, 1867
was known as the British North America Act, 1867, but it and several other British
and Canadian statutes were renamed by the schedule to the Constitution Act,
1982. Constitution Act, 1982, supra, sch. 1.
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A. THE SENATE'S FORM AND COMPOSITION
The Senate serves as an appointed second chamber to the Canadian
Parliament. In the Senate, Canada is divided up into four divisions, each
represented by twenty-four senators, as well as six senators for the prov-
ince of Newfoundland and Labrador and one each for the Yukon Terri-
tory, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut-leaving the Senate with a
regular total membership of 105.2 Also, under the Constitution the Gov-
ernor General has the right to determine that an extraordinary circum-
stance is present where the four divisions are in need of extra
representation and recommend to the Canadian Monarch that four (one
per region) or eight (two per region) additional senators be appointed.3
Such appointments bring the total number of senators to 109 or 113, but
that number gradually returns to 105 as vacancies from the regions are
not filled until a region has less than twenty-four senators.4 In practice,
though, all senators are chosen by the Prime Minister and their appoint-
ment by the Governor General or the Monarch is a technical formality.
5
B. THE SENATE'S POWERS
In terms of power, the Senate has nearly the same legislative powers as
the directly elected lower chamber, the House of Commons.6 The differ-
ences between the chambers are that: (1) spending legislation has to orig-
inate in the House of Commons; (2) the Government is only responsible
to the Commons (i.e., a no confidence vote in the Senate cannot bring
down a Government); and (3) following a 1982 amendment to the Consti-
tution, the Senate cannot vote down a constitutional amendment ap-
proved by the Commons but can merely delay it for 180 days, after which
it can clear Parliament by another affirmative vote in the Commons.
7
While the Senate can vote down legislation approved by the Commons
and in the early years after Canadian Confederation did so frequently, it
has over time rarely exercised that veto.8 Senators originally served for
2. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1, § 22.
3. Id. § 26.
4. See id. § 27. The power to appoint extra senators is controversial and there have
only ever been two attempts to persuade the Monarch to use it: the first, by Lib-
eral Prime Minister, Alexander Mackenzie, in 1873, was refused by Queen Victo-
ria; the second, by Progressive Conservative Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, in
1990 for eight extra Senators so that he could overcome Senate opposition and
implement a Goods and Services Tax, was granted by Queen Elizabeth II, 1990:
Mulroney Stacks Senate to Pass the GST, CBC DIGITAL AIiciIvi.s (Sept. 27,
2013), http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/politics/federal-politics/federal-poli
tics-general/mulroney-stacks-senate-to-pass-the-gst.html (for factual information
see the "Did You Know?" tab, and for citation information see the "Citation" tab).
5. See JEAN-RoI)IIGuI PARI, SrNATIr REI'ORM IN CANADA, PRB-09-08E 1 (Aug.
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life,9 but all senators appointed since a 1965 amendment serve until they
turn seventy-five and then enter into mandatory retirement.10
C. SENATORIAL QUALIFICATIONS
To qualify to serve in the Senate, one must be thirty years old, a subject
of the Monarch (senators thus do not have to be Canadian citizens
though in practice they typically are), 1 and live in and own $4,000 (total
net value excluding debts) of property in the province or territory he or
she represents.1 2 In the case of Quebec, the senatorial division that cov-
ers the whole province is parceled into twenty-four individual electoral
divisions and Qu6b6cois senators, in addition to the regular property and
residency requirements, must either live in or own $4,000 worth of prop-
erty in the electoral division they represent.13 It is the above institutional
structure that has led to repeated calls for reform over the last century
and a half. 14
II. SENATE REFORM IN CANADA: A BACKGROUND PRIMER
Since shortly after the time of Confederation in 1867, reform (or abol-
ishment) of the Senate has from time to time become a hot button issue
in Canadian political discourse. 15 Since 1874, there have been a series of
proposals to-amongst other things-limit lifetime appointments, allow
for each provincial government to exercise some role in selecting its prov-
ince's senators or to pick them outright, have direct senatorial elections,
provide for equal representation of the provinces, and to abolish the Sen-
ate altogether. 16
9. JACK STILBORN, SINATF REFORM: ISSUES AND RECENT DFVEILOPMENTS, PRB-
07-42E 1 (Jan. 21, 2008) (Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/
researchpublications/prb0742-e.pdf.
10. ANDIoI BARNFS ET AL., REFORMING THE SENATE OF CANADA: FRFQUE-NT1_Y
ASKED QUESTIONS 6 (Sept. 12, 2011) (Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/
content/lop/researchpublications/2011 -83-e.pdf.
11. Id. at 13.
12. See PARI.t;, supra note 5, at 1. The requirement that Senators own $4,000 worth of
property in the province they represent substantially limited the pool of potential
Senate nominees in that body's early days, but as the monetary value of the prop-
erty requirement has not changed since 1867 inflation has made it a fairly negligi-
ble consideration, STILLBORN, supra note 9, at 1-2. The requirement interestingly
enough came into play in 1997 when Sister Peggy Butts, a university professor and
Roman Catholic nun who had taken a vow of poverty, was appointed by Liberal
Prime Minister Jean Chrdtien, necessitating that Butts' religious order transfer a
small parcel of land into her name so that she could overcome the property re-
quirement and take her seat in the Senate, Canada's Upper House: Do We Need
The Senate?, CBC NEws (Apr. 1998), http://web.archive.org/web/20071016103302/
http://www.cbc.ca/newsinreview/apr98/senate/consitut.htm (accessed by searching
for CBC news in the Internet Archive index).
13. See PARI., supra note 5, at 1.
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A. THE PRIMARY MOTIVATIONS FOR REFORM
Advocates for reform or abolishment of the Senate frequently point to
the method of selecting senators and the way senate seats are distributed
as primary motivating reasons for their efforts. 17 Because senators are
appointed by the Prime Minister and can serve for up to forty-five years,
two democracy-related concerns arise. First, the institution lacks demo-
cratic legitimacy as it is appointed and senators do not have to share the
views of the people they represent who in turn have no way to remove
them from office. 18 Second, absent democratic elections, senators who
are at least theoretically in Parliament to represent the interests of their
provinces are under no obligation or democratic pressure to do so. 19 If
senators were elected, then those two concerns would be largely-if not
entirely-moot. But new concerns might arise as the appointment pro-
cess has led the appointed Senate to possess a good proportion of female
and minority representation, and the electoral campaign process might
lead to a decrease in senators with specialized experiences or expertise as
well as the valuable contributions they make to the parliamentary
process.20
Because today senate seats are still basically distributed according to
the formula laid out in 1867, the representation of provinces and territo-
ries in the Senate adheres to neither equal nor populationally-propor-
tional representation. 21 This leads to a situation where some provinces
and territories have more senators (and thus representation) than their
proportional share of the Canadian populace to the detriment of some of
the other provinces. 22 The disadvantaged provinces thus resent their
lesser level of representation while those provinces and territories that
benefit are not particularly inclined to change the status quo.23
Proponents of outright abolishment of the Senate will point to the
above two reasons and will argue that Parliament itself does not need an
upper chamber.24 The argument that the Federal Parliament in Ottawa
should be able to function with a single chamber has for decades been
championed by the opposition New Democratic Party.25 In support of
outright abolishment, it has often pointed out that seven of the provinces
used to have their own upper chambers and that by 1928 five of them had
17. See BARNES, supra note 10, at 13-14.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 14.
21. See id. at 22-23.
22. See id.
23. See DAVIu E. SM! i-, FIJLWRAIISM AND THiE CONSTIrTUTION 1 CANA1)A 78-79
(2010).
24. See, e.g., Bonnie K. Goodman, NDP Leader Thomas Mulcair Launches Senate
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been abolished, with the last one closing its doors in 1969.26
B. PREVIOUS REFORMS
Formal constitutional reforms to the Senate-though rare-have oc-
curred in the past. These have included: (1) expansion of the Senate to
accommodate new provinces and territories; (2) the 1965 constitutional
amendment implementing the mandatory retirement age of seventy-five;
and (3) the 1982 constitutional amendment allowing the Senate to only
delay, rather than outright defeat, amendments to the Constitution. 27
One additional reform was judicially achieved in 1929 when the United
Kingdom-based Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Canada's then-
highest court of appeals) reversed a contrary judgment by the Supreme
Court of Canada and ruled that for the purposes of the Canadian Consti-
tution, women were persons and thus eligible to be appointed to the
Senate.28
C. THE CURRENT PUSH FOR REFORM
Senate reform gained significant traction and public attention following
a public expense scandal that emerged in late 2012 when one veteran
Liberal Senator Mac Harb29 and three Conservative Senators appointed
by Harper in early 2009 (Mike Duffy, Pamela Wallin and Patrick
Brazeau) 30 were found to have falsely billed the Senate for several thou-
sand dollars in travel and housing expenses.31 Harb paid back the money
he falsely claimed and resigned in August 2013.32 On November 5, 2013,
Duffy, Wallin, and Brazeau were suspended from the Senate without pay
but with health benefits until after the next general election in 2015. 33
At nearly the same time, current Conservative Prime Minister Stephen
Harper, who has for several years supported the idea of an elected Senate
with fixed terms, began pushing Senate reform legislation that had been
introduced into the House of Commons in 2011 that would set fixed,
nine-year terms for senators and allow the provinces to hold Senate elec-
26. Id.
27. See BARNE.S, supra note 10, at 6.
28. See id.; Edwards v. Attorney General of Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Can.).
29. Senator Mac Harb Pays Back $231,000 in Expenses, Retires, CBC Ni7ws (Aug. 26,
2013, 5:52 PM), http:/lwww.cbc.ca/news/politics/senator-mac-harb-pays-back-231-
000-in-expenses-retires-I.1308485.
30. Wallin, Duffy among 18 named to fill Senate seats, CBC Niiws (Dec. 22, 2008, 7:02
PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/wallin-duffy-among-1 8-named-to-fill-senate-
seats-1.715239.
31. Timeline: Key Dates in the Evolution of the Senate Expense-Claim Controversy,
GLOB^i Niws (Feb. 4, 2014, 2:33 PM), http://globalnews.ca/news/568714/a-look-
at-key-dates-in-the-evolution-of-the-senate-expense-claim-controversy/.
32. Senator Mac Harb Pays Back $231,000 in Expenses, Retires, supra note 29.
33. Andrea Janus, Senators Vote to Oust Duffy, Brazeau and Wallin, CTV Ni-ws (Nov.
5, 2013, 7:24 PM), http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/senators-vote-to-oust-duffy-
brazeau-and-wallin-1.1528784.
20141
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tions.34 The Government of Quebec, however, sued Harper's Federal
Government in 2012 on the grounds that the proposed constitutional
amendments to achieve Senate reform could not be constitutionally
passed by Parliament alone. 35
Under the Constitution Act, 1982, Parliament can pass certain types of
amendments alone, but some amendments must be passed by Parliament
and the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces that
contain at least 50 percent of the total population of Canada, and other
amendments require the approval of Parliament and all of the provincial
legislatures. 36 Quebec argued, and in October 2013 the Quebec Court of
Appeal agreed, that any amendment allowing for elections or implement-
ing fixed-length terms could not be implemented by Parliament unilater-
ally and had to be approved by Parliament and two-thirds of the
provincial legislatures representing at least half of the population. 37
Questions as to how Senate reform had to be constitutionally imple-
mented in fact led the Harper Government in 2013 to file a reference case
with the Supreme Court of Canada asking for clarification as to how six
frequently discussed potential reforms (including outright abolishment)
would have to be implemented in accordance with the Constitution.38
III. REFERENCE RE: SENATE REFORM AND THE PROCESS
OF REMAKING THE CANADIAN SENATE
On April 25, 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada released its unani-
mous decision in the Harper Government's reference case, Reference re
Senate Reform, breaking down each of the Government's questions in
meticulous detail and, for the most part, ruling that Parliament cannot
unilaterally make reformative changes to the Senate. 39 The case is also of
particular importance as it represents the first time the Supreme Court
has weighed in in detail on the process of amending the Constitution es-
tablished by the Constitution Act, 1982.40
A. THE FIRST QUESTION: FIXED SENATORIAL TERMS
In its first question, the Government asked the Court if Parliament
alone had the ability to reform the Senate by (1) creating fixed terms of
nine years, eight years or less, or ten years or more for senators; (2) creat-
34. The Canadian Press, Senate Reform Canada: A Chronology of Nearly 150 Years of
Proposals, Hui-i PosT Poi. CAN. (Apr. 25, 2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.huffington
post.ca/2014/04/25/senate-reform-canada-chronology-n_521 4302.html.
35. See id.
36. See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1, §§ 38-47.
37. See The Canadian Press, Harper Senate Reform Bill Rejected by Quebec Appeal
Court, CBC NEws (Oct. 24, 2013, 3:03 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/
harper-senate-reform-bill-rejected-by-quebec-appeal-court-I.2223975.
38. The Canadian Press, supra note 34.
39. Leslie MacKinnon, Senate Reform Can't be Done by Ottawa Alone, CBC Niws
(Apr. 25, 2014, 6:55 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/senate-reform-can-t-be-
done-by-ottawa-alone-1.2621712.
40. Id.
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ing fixed terms for senators of two or three parliaments; (3) proving for
renewable terms for senators; (4) limiting the terms of senators appointed
after October 14, 2008; or (5) imposing limits on the terms of senators
appointed before October 14, 2008.41 In looking at the Government's
questions regarding various types of terms for senators, the Court deter-
mined that any change to the Senate that would alter its fundamental
nature or role would impose on the interests of the provinces and would
thus have to be approved by both Parliament and two-thirds of the prov-
inces representing more than 50 percent of the total Canadian populace,
as laid out in section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982.42 The Court refers
to this as the "7/50 procedure. '43
With the above framework established, the Court then held fixed terms
would fundamentally change the Senate by removing the tenure protec-
tions that currently allow senators to directly question or challenge pro-
posals of the House of Commons and the Government without fear of
loss of office. 44 Because the imposition of senatorial terms would be a
fundamental change to the nature of the Senate, the Court determined
that such a change would be subject to the 7/50 procedure.4 5
B. THE SECOND AND THIRD QUESTIONS: CONSULTATIVE
SENATORIAL ELECTIONS
The Government's second question asked the Court to determine if
Parliament had the authority to unilaterally enact legislation that would
allow for consultative elections to be held in each province and territory
to propose potential nominees for appointment to the Senate. 46 Simi-
larly, the Government's third question asked if Parliament had the power
to enact legislation that would allow those provincial and territorial legis-
latures that so desired to enact their own legislation to hold consultative
elections, whereby their people could propose senatorial nominees to the
Government. 4 7 The Government argued that because the changes neces-
sary to bring about consultative elections would not necessitate any
change to the text of the Constitution, they would not be constitutional
amendments and thus could be done by Parliament acting alone. 48
The Court disagreed and said that because consultative elections would
significantly alter the Senate's "fundamental nature and role as a comple-
mentary legislative body of sober second thought," they would in fact
constitute a constitutional amendment. 49 Because an amendment intro-
ducing consultative senate elections would be a change to the architec-
41. Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 S.C.C. 32, para. 5 (Can.).
42. Id. paras. 77, 82.
43. Id. para. 82.
44. Id. paras. 78-80.
45. Id. para. 82.
46. Id. para. 5.
47. Id.
48. Id. para. 51.
49. Id. para. 52.
2014]
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tural structure of the Constitution, the Court determined that such a
change could only be implemented via the general 7/50 procedure. 50
C. THE FOURTH QUESTION: THE REPEAL OF
PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS
The government's fourth question asked if Parliament had the constitu-
tional authority to unilaterally repeal the existing constitutional property
requirements for service in the Senate.51 The Court ruled that Parlia-
ment has the authority to repeal the requirement that senators have prop-
erty with a net worth of $4,000.52 The court described such an
amendment that "updates the constitutional framework relating to the
Senate without affecting the institution's fundamental nature and role" as
precisely what the framers of the Constitution Act, 1982 had in mind
when they allowed the Parliament to have some unilateral control over
amendments affecting Parliament and the Federal Government. 53 The
Court further ruled that in all of the provinces but Quebec, Parliament
could unilaterally repeal the requirement that senators own $4,000 of real
property in the province they represent.54 Because of the way Quebec's
senatorial electoral divisions are structured and provided for in the Con-
stitution, any amendment to the real property requirements for
Qu6b6cois Senators would have to be passed by both Parliament and
Quebec's legislative assembly.55
D. THE FIFrH AND SIXTH QUESTIONS: ABOLISHING THE SENATE
The Government's fifth question asked if Parliament had the power on
its own to abolish the Senate by either: (1) inserting an amendment into
the Constitution stating that the Senate was to be abolished; (2) changing
or repealing some or all of the references to the Senate in the Constitu-
tion; or (3) by abolishing the powers of the Senate and revoking those
constitutional provisions providing senatorial representation to the prov-
inces. 56 The Government's sixth and final question asked the Court to
determine-if it ended up concluding that Parliament could not abolish
the Senate on its own-whether it could be abolished via the 7/50 proce-
dure or if the abolishment of the Senate required the unanimous consent
of all of the provinces. 57
The Harper Government tried to argue that because its proposal to
have Parliament abolish the Senate would only alter the powers of the
Senate and the numbers of its members, then it should be constitutionally
50. Id. para. 70.
51. Id. para. 5.
52. Id. para. 86.
53. See id. para. 90.
54. Id. para. 86.
55. Id.
56. Id. para. 5.
57. See id. para. 5.
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permissible. 58 Alternatively, the Government argued that the correct
process to abolish the Senate would be the 7/50 procedure.5 9
The Government's argument was outright and bluntly rejected by the
Court when it declared:
We cannot accept the Attorney General's arguments. Abolition of
the Senate is not merely a matter of "powers" or "members"
under.., the Constitution Act, 1982. Rather, abolition of the Senate
would fundamentally alter our constitutional architecture-by re-
moving the bicameral form of government that gives shape to the
Constitution Act, 1867-and would... require[ ] the unanimous con-
sent of Parliament and the provinces. 60
The Court both determined that Parliament cannot abolish the Senate
on its own and that the Senate cannot be abolished absent the agreement
of Parliament and all of the provinces- the political realities of that una-
nimity requirement being that the Senate's survival for the foreseeable
future is reasonably well assured. 6 1
Through Reference re Senate Reform, the Supreme Court of Canada
has provided a great deal of clarity and explanation on the applicability of
the various mechanisms for amending the Canadian Constitution, includ-
ing making clear that most changes to major constitutionally created bod-
ies must be approved by two-thirds of the provinces, representing more
than half of the Canadian populace, and that any move to abolish such a
constitutional body must be approved by both Parliament and all of the
provincial legislatures. 62
IV. THE FUTURE OF SENATE REFORM IN LIGHT OF
REFERENCE RE SENATE REFORM
Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Reference re Sen-
ate Reform, it is not at all certain how, when, or if Senate reform will
continue. On January 29, 2014, after the decision of the Quebec Court of
Appeals but before the decision of the Supreme Court, in what could be
considered a mini-reform, Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau removed the
Liberal Senators from his party caucus and barred them from officially
engaging in Liberal Party fundraising and campaigning. 63 Trudeau predi-
cated his actions on the belief that by releasing Liberal Senators from
their partisan political positions, they will be able to function indepen-
dently of the political process and more ably devote themselves to their
58. Id. para. 96.
59. Id.
60. Id. para. 97.
61. See MacKinnon, supra note 39.
62. See id.
63. See Kim Mackrael & Josh Wingrove, What Trudeau's Liberal Caucus Shakeup
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senatorial responsibilities. 64 This separation seems directed towards a
gradual implementation of a senate of independent figures who are able
to primarily devote themselves to the task of reviewing and enhancing the
Parliamentary legislative process. 65 But its short term effectiveness is
somewhat less pronounced as the existing Liberal Senators have simply
reorganized themselves as a Senate Liberal caucus separate from the Par-
liamentary (i.e., House of Commons) Liberal caucus.66
Following the Supreme Court's decision Trudeau announced a reform
plan that would have an informal (i.e., not entrenched in legislation or
officially binding on Prime Ministers) advisory commission to vet pro-
spective, non-partisan senators and make recommendations on appoint-
ments to the Prime Minister.67 New Democratic Party Leader, Thomas
Mulcair, who is himself fervently committed towards working for the out-
right abolishment of the Senate, attacked Trudeau's plan, claiming that
the Court's opinion in the reference case indicates that it would be un-
constitutional. 68 But several legal experts have claimed that Mulcair is
mistaken and that if Trudeau's panel is merely advisory and not binding,
then it passes all constitutional hurdles, raising the prospect that it might
be the only viable, substantive near-term reform or change to the
Senate. 69
Following the Supreme Court's rejection of his government's parlia-
mentary reform proposals, Prime Minister Stephen Harper seems to be
operating under some misconceptions as to what the reference case ruling
means. 70 Harper has publically stated that because of the Supreme Court
decision in the reference case, the Federal Government is barred from
initiating Senate reforms and that they must be initiated by the prov-
inces. 71 The Prime Minister has also made clear that he will take any
proposals for reform from the provinces seriously and voiced an opinion
that absent senate reform, the institution should "as is be abolished,"
while stressing his belief that even that decision would be up to the prov-
inces.7 2 But the Prime Minister is wrong when he says that the Supreme
Court barred the Federal Government from initiating reform. 73 Rather
than restricting where a reform must be initiated, all the Court said was




67. Joan Bryden, Mulcair's Comments On Trudeau Senate Plan Full Of Baloney?,




70. See The Canadian Press, Senate Reform: Harper Says Issue Now In Hands of Prov-
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cial and parliamentary approval. 74 In any case, it appears for the foresee-
able future that the New Democratic Party will continue to push for
abolition of the Senate; the Liberals will advocate for an advisory Senate
full of non-partisan independents; and the Conservatives would like to
see Senate reform but for now have passed that political hockey puck to
the provinces.
V. CONCLUSION
Reform of the Canadian Senate has been a hotly discussed topic since
at least 1874, only seven years after the Senate was established at the time
of Canadian Confederation.7 5 Despite being a topic of fervent political
discourse for at least 140 years, very little has been achieved in terms of
genuine senatorial reform. One could even make a pretty strong case
that the Senate of 2014 is-aside from some largely superficial changes-
structurally identical to the Senate of 1867. The current political situation
being what it is-it would appear that while small reforms such as the
abolishment of senatorial property qualifications or the creation of infor-
mal appointments advisory panels might be possible for the time being,
attempts to comprehensively reform the Senate will unlikely succeed
while attempts to abolish the upper house will all but certainly fail. The
political difficulties of altering the institutional fabric of the Senate have
kept it relatively unchanged for 147 years and will likely continue to pre-
vent any comprehensive institutional change for some time to come.
That being said, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Reference re
Senate Reform has, at the very least, removed the constitutional ambigu-
ity surrounding most questions of Senate reform, making it possible for
the first time for proponents and opponents of various changes to defini-
tively plot out the constitutional requirements for implementing or block-
ing any proposed changes.
74. Id.
75. See BARNES supra note 10, at 6.
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